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Abstract
This paper confronts the tractability problems that accompany IPV auction models with multi-unit bidder demands.
Utilizing a first order approach, the asymptotic properties of symmetric equilibria in discriminatory and uniform price
auctions are derived. It is shown that as the number of bidders increases, equilibrium bids converge to valuations in
both discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions where the price paid is determined by the lowest winning bid,
thus indicating that the limiting case of these auctions correspond to price taking as in neoclassical models of consumer
behavior. However, when the uniform price paid is tied to the highest losing bid, price taking behavior does not ensue
and ex post inefficient allocations ares possible. The impact of our results on analysis of k-double auctions with multiunit bidders demands is also discussed.
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1. Introduction
The majority of results established by the literature on auctions with
multi-unit bidder demands have been limited due to an absence of analytic solutions (see Ausubel and Cramton 2002, Black and DeMeza 1992,
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn 1998a, 1998b, Katzman 1995, 1999, and
Noussair 1995). The inherent problem in examining auctions with multiunit demands stems from the complexity of the first order conditions in the
bidder’s problem. This complexity results from the fact that bidders submit multiple bids, each potentially formulated using a diﬀerent bid function.
That is, the amount that a bidder’s kth bid is shaded below its corresponding
valuation may diﬀer from the amount that his k + 1st bid would be shaded
below the same valuation, a strategy that we refer to as diﬀerential shading.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1999), Swinkels (1999, 2001), Jackson and Kremer (2002), and Chakraborty and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2005) have avoided
tractability problems by examining eﬃciency and prices asymptotically. For
instance, Swinkels (1999, 2001) shows that both the discriminatory and uniform price auctions generate ex ante eﬃciency when there are a large number
of bidders. His work is appealing in that no assumptions regarding symmetry of bidders, nor equilibrium are necessary to generate his results. However, while he oﬀers valuable insight into equilibrium behavior in the limit,
this approach admittedly is not “able to draw the connection between limit
equilibria and the standard equilibrium of simple auctions.” Our paper characterizes just that link by deriving the asymptotic properties of equilibrium
directly from an individual bidder’s maximization problem.
Our paper is less concerned with the asymptotic eﬃciency of auctions
than with whether models of those auctions generate price taking behavior
as the number of bidders grows large. That is, we ask if the limiting case of
these auctions is in line with the neoclassical assumptions of price taking. We
find that price taking does result in the discriminatory auction and uniform
auction where the price paid equals the lowest winning bid. However, whenever the price paid in a uniform price auction is tied to the highest losing
bid,1 diﬀerential shading persists and price taking does not emerge.
Finally, an issue related to bid shading in uniform price auctions is bid/oﬀer
misrepresentation in the k-double auction studied by Rustichini et al. (1994)
1
This uniform price auction has been examined quite often given its similarity to a
second price single object auction where the highest losing bid determines the price paid.
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where buyers (sellers) demand (supply) a single unit. They show that price
taking emerges as the number of bidders grows. We develop a k-uniform price
auction similar to their k-double auction and our results indicate that bid
misrepresentation will not disappear in k-double auctions if multiple units are
demanded by individual bidders and that the neoclassical model of markets
is not the limiting case of the k-double auction.
2. The Environment
Discriminatory and uniform price auctions are used to sell m homogeneous objects to N + 1 risk neutral bidders. Each bidder (n = 1, . . . , N + 1)
has a positive valuation for d ≤ m objects. The marginal valuations of bidder
n are denoted vn (h), h = 1, . . . , d. A downward sloping demand property is
imposed on each bidder’s valuations in that, vn (1) ≥ vn (2) ≥ · · · ≥ vn (d).
Bidder’s valuation vectors, v, are drawn independently from a joint distribution function F (v) that is continuously diﬀerentiable in all of its arguments
with an atomless corresponding distribution function, the zero vector as a
lower bound, and a finite symmetric vector as an upper bound.
In order to formulate a bidder’s maximization problem in each auction,
that bidder’s probabilistic beliefs about his opponents’ bids must be specified.
This section specifies the distributions of these bids in general terms. In each
auction, individual bidders submit d bids. In a given auction, an individual
bidder competes against the highest m of the dN bids placed by his opponents. Let ∆k (b) denote the cumulative distribution of the kth highest of
these bids. Clearly, these distributions depend on the strategies employed by
the bidder’s opponents, which themselves will depend on the auction format.
The ex ante symmetry of bidders leads to focus on symmetric equilibria.
Assume that in auction form a (= discriminatory, uniform) each bidder believes that his opponents are using the bid function, Ba (v) : Rd → Rd , that is
continuously diﬀerentiable and monotonic increasing in all of its arguments.
The fact that opponents’ bid strategies and valuation distributions are identical dictates that the probability measure over any one opponent’s bids is
identical to that over any other opponent’s bids. Let αj (b), j = 0, . . . , d,
represent the probability that a bid b, is less than exactly j of another bidder’s bids and higher than the other d − j of that other bidder’s bids. By
0
the above assumptions αj (b) may be positive or negative with the exception
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that α0 (b) > 0 ∀b. Letting i denote the number of bids another player has
above a bid (b), λi indicates the number of individual bidders for which this
is true. Using this formulation, ∆k (b) is defined by the following recurrence
relation, with ∆0 (b) = 0,
∆k (b) = ∆k−1 (b) +
P
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It follows that the density of the kth highest bid is defined by the following
recurrence relation, with δ0 (b) = 0,
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Before continuing, an example of how λ works will ease the burden on
the reader. ∆3 (b) − ∆2 (b) is the probability that b is less than exactly three
opponents’ bids and greater than the remaining dN − 3 bids. The three ways
that this can happen are (1) b is less than a single bid from three diﬀerent
opponents in which case λ0 = N − 3, λ1 = 3, and λ2 = λ3 = · · · = λd = 0.
(2) b is less than one of a single opponent’s bids, less than two of another
opponent’s bids, and greater than all other opponents’ bids in which case
λ0 = N − 2, λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1, and λ3 = λ4 = · · · = λd = 0. (3) b is less than
three of a single opponent’s bids and greater than all other bids in which
case λ0 = N − 1, λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, λ3 = 1, and λ4 = λ5 = · · · = λd = 0. Notice
P
P
that in each case di=1 iλi = 3 and that dj=0 λj = N as is required.
3. The Discriminatory Auction

A bidder that wins t ≤ d objects pays
max

b1 ,...,bd

s.t.
2

d
X

Pt

i=1 bi .

The bidder’s problem is

(v(j) − bj )∆m+1−j (bj )

(3)

j=1

bn ≥ bl ,

1 ≤ n < l ≤ d.

The cobinatorial term in Eq. (1) is similar to the combinatorial expression of the
multinomial expansion, (a + b)k−1 . The primary diﬀerence is that the multinomial expanPk−1
sion is summed over the values of λ such that i=1 λi = k − 1, whereas our sum is taken
P
over values of λ for which k−1
i=1 iλi = k − 1.

3

If the constraints do not bind, the relevant first order conditions are
(v(j) − bj )δm+1−j (bj ) − ∆m+1−j (bj ) = 0,

j = 1, . . . , d.

(4)

However, the constraints will bind in this case for certain realizations of
valuations. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998b) and Katzman (1995)
first showed the intuition behind the binding constraints using the case where
two units are sold. In that case, the system of Eqs. (4) reduces to
(v(1) − b1 )δ2 (b1 ) − ∆2 (b1 ) = 0
(v(2) − b2 )δ1 (b2 ) − ∆1 (b2 ) = 0,
the solution of which is not analytically tractable and can only be obtained
using numerical techniques. The lack of analytic tractability in a system of
equations of this type is not new to auction theory. Maskin and Riley (2000)
have encountered a similar system of equations when analyzing single object
auctions in the presence of ex ante bidder asymmetry. Perhaps surprisingly,
the intuition provided by Maskin and Riley (2000) applies here as well, despite the fact that bidders are ex ante symmetric. This is most easily seen
in the case of two objects being auctioned. In such a situation, a bidder’s
high bid must only be greater than the second highest of his opponents’ bids
while his low bid must exceed all of his opponents’ bids. The result is that
the bidder formulates his low bid using a more aggressive function than that
used to formulate his high bid. This diﬀerence in aggressiveness creates a
tendency for low bids to be above high bids when the two valuations are too
“close” together. When this occurs, the constraint is violated and KuhnTucker optimization is needed. This creates an additional equation that can
be used to eliminate the Lagrangian multiplier. The result is a third equation
in the system,
(L − b∗ )δ2 (b∗ ) − ∆2 (b∗ ) + (L − b∗ )δ1 (b∗ ) − ∆1 (b∗ ) = 0

(5)

where L is defined as the highest low valuation that can lead to identical bids
of b∗ . Figure 1 shows the equilibrium level curves. There are two regions; one
where diﬀerent bids, b1 and b2 , are submitted (when valuations are far enough
apart), the other where identical bids, b∗ , are submitted (when valuations are
close enough together). Diﬀerential shading is seen by the fact that the level
curves for the high and low bids do not meet at the 45o line.
4

Figure 1: Discriminatory Auction Level Curves
4. The Uniform Price Auction
This section formulates a bidder’s problem for a k-uniform price auction
where the price paid by winning bidders is k times the highest losing bid plus
(1 − k) times the lowest winning bid. A bidder that wins t ≤ d objects in
this auction pays t times the market clearing price. The bidder’s problem is
max
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bd+1 = 0.
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⎤

jbj [∆m+1−j (bj ) − ∆m−j (bj )]⎦

The resulting first order conditions are
[v(j) − bj ]δm+1−j (bj ) − k(j − 1)[∆m+2−j (bj ) − ∆m+1−j (bj )]
− (1 − k)j[∆m+1−j (bj ) − ∆m−j (bj )] = 0, j = 1, ..., d.

(6)

As in the discriminatory auction example, an analytic solution to this system
is unattainable. In order to understand diﬀerential shading in this environment, let us return to the example of the last section, examined now in terms
of the special case of k = 1 where the first order conditions are
[v(j)−bj ]δm+1−j (bj )−(j −1)[∆m+2−j (bj )−∆m+1−j (bj )] = 0, j = 1, ..., d. (7)
When bidders only demand one unit each (j = 1), Eq. (7) gives the dominant
strategy of placing a high bid equal to ones high valuation. However, Eq.
(7) also shows that for j > 1, bids should be shaded below valuations. As
opposed to bids in the discriminatory auction, diﬀerential shading in this case
consists of low bids that are shaded more than high bids: a result deemed
demand reduction by Ausubel and Cramton (2002).

Figure 2: Uniform Price Auction Level Curves
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Diﬀerential shading can be seen in Figure 2 as the high and low bid level
curves do not meet at the 45o line.
5. Asymptotic Results
The methodology used in this section is quite simple. Using the first order
conditions derived in Sections 3 and 4, the level of bid shading is isolated
and examined as N → ∞. Price taking will emerge if all bids approach their
corresponding valuations. Before proceeding we note that while the model
was set up for any increasing bid functions used by a bidder’s opponents, in
this section we simply assume that opponents are bidding their valuations
(which is a strictly increasing function itself) and ask if, in the limit, it is
optimal for the optimizer to do so as well.
Lemma 1 Given the assumptions on F (v) and opponent bid functions, the
m+1−j (bj )
expression ∆δm+1−j
approaches zero as N → ∞.
(bj )
Proof. Eq. (1) gives
∆m+1−j (bj ) − ∆m−j (bj ) =
and Eq. (2) gives
δm+1−j (bj ) = δm−j (bj ) +

d
X
l=0

P
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iλi =m−j

X

iλi =m−j
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! d
Y

w=0

λw

αw (b)
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d
N
αl0 (bj )λl Y
αw (b)λw ,
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P
where λ0 = N − dj=1 λj .
The laws of limits allow us to make a number of simplifications by making
a few useful
term
³
´ observations. (1) any summation
³ using´the combinatorial
³
´
N
N
N
, the term with the coeﬃcient m−j,0,...,0 = m−j will contain
λ1 ,...,λm−j
m−j
N
/(m − j)!, the highest order term in N possible. (2) α0 (b) is the only
α term raised to a power dependent on N. (3) dividing the numerator and
m+1−j (bj )
by N m−j α0 (b)N−m+j has two aﬀects when taking
denominator of ∆δm+1−j
(bj )
the limit as N → ∞. First, dividing by α0 (b)N−m+j removes all dependence
on N from the α probabilities and therefore only the combinatorial terms
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will be aﬀected as N → ∞. Second, because every N in the combinatorial
terms is raised to a power less than or equal to m − j, dividing by N m−j and
taking the limit as N → ∞ will cause all terms of order lower than m − j to
vanish. Dividing the numerator and denominator by N m−j α0 (b)N−m+j and
taking the limit as N → ∞, the numerator becomes α1 (b)m−j , a finite value.
Likewise, the denominator becomes
lim

N →∞

(

)

α1 (b)m−j 0
(N − m + j)
α (b) + (m − j) α1 (b)m−j−1 α10 (b) ,
α0 (b) 0

the limit of which clearly goes to infinity since α0 (b) 6= 0.
Theorem 2 Diﬀerential shading vanishes in the discriminatory auction as
N → ∞ and price taking results.
Proof. Rearranging Eq. (4) gives
(v(j) − bj ) =

∆m+1−j (bj )
, j = 1, . . . , d.
δm+1−j (bj )

(10)

The LHS of Eq. (10) can be seen as the amount that bid j is shaded below
valuation v(j). Lemma 1 shows that the RHS of Eq. (10) approaches zero
as N → ∞ and therefore, all bids approach their corresponding valuations.
Since all bids eventually equal valuations, diﬀerential shading vanishes and
the constraints do not bind in the limit.
Remark 1. The convergence of bids to valuations in the discriminatory
auction is easily seen in Figure 1. As the number of bidders increases, the
shaded region shrinks until the point at which the high and low bid level
curves meet approaches the 45o line.
Lemma 3 Given the assumptions on F (v) and opponent bid functions, the
(bj )−∆m−j (bj )]
expression j [∆m+1−j
approaches zero as N → ∞.
δm+1−j (bj )
Proof. A few useful observations are in order. (1) the term [∆m+1−j (bj ) −
∆m−j (bj )] reduces to:
P
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λ1 , ..., λd
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(bj )−∆m+1−j (bj )]
by
(3) Dividing the numerator and denominator of [∆m+2−jδm+1−j
(bj )
m−j
N−m+j
N
α0 (b)
has two eﬀects. First, since all α0 (b) terms are raised to a
power dependent on N, dividing by α0 (b)N−m+j will remove all dependence
on N from the α probabilities and the taking the limit will only aﬀect the
combinatorial terms. Second, dividing by N m−j will cause all terms in which
N is raised to a power less than m − j to vanish in the limit. Dividing
the numerator and denominator by N m−j α0 (b)N−m+j and taking the limit
as N → ∞, the numerator becomes α1 (b)m−j , a finite value. Likewise, the
denominator becomes

lim

N →∞

(

)

α1 (b)m−j 0
α0 (b) + (m − j) α1 (b)m−j−1 α10 (b) ,
(N − m + j)
α0 (b)

the limit of which clearly goes to infinity since α0 (b) 6= 0.
Lemma 4 Given the assumptions on F (v) and opponent bid functions, the
(bj )−∆m+1−j (bj )]
(j−1)α1 (b)
approaches (m+1−j)α
expression (j − 1) [∆m+2−jδm+1−j
0 (b) as N → ∞.
(bj )
0

Proof. A few useful observations are in order. (1) the term [∆m+2−j (bj ) −
∆m+1−j (bj )] reduces to:
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iλi =m+1−j

Ã

N
λ1 , ..., λd

(2) the term with the coeﬃcient
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will be of the highest order in

(bj )−∆m−j (bj )]
by
N. (3) Dividing the numerator and denominator of [∆m+1−j
δm+1−j (bj )
m+1−j
N−m−1+j
N
α0 (b)
has two eﬀects. First, since all α0 (b) terms are raised
to a power dependent on N, dividing by α0 (b)N−m−1+j removes all dependence on N from the α probabilities and taking the limit will only aﬀect
the combinatorial terms. Second, dividing by N m+1−j will cause all terms in
which N is raised to a power less than m + 1 − j to vanish in the limit. Dividing the numerator and denominator by N m+1−j α0 (b)N−m−1+j and taking
the limit as N → ∞, reduces the numerator to (j − 1)α1 (b)m+1−j , a finite
number. Likewise, the denominator becomes α1 (b)m−j α00 (b), a finite number
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since α00 (b) > 0. The only way for diﬀerential shading to vanish in this case
is for α0 (b) to approach infinity. However, it cannot given the assumptions
that opponents are bidding their valuations.
Theorem 5 As N → ∞, diﬀerential shading persists in the k-uniform price
auction when k ∈ (0, 1], but price taking emerges when k = 0.
Proof. Rearranging Eq. (6) gives
[∆m+2−j (bj ) − ∆m+1−j (bj )]
δm+1−j (bj )
[∆m+1−j (bj ) − ∆m−j (bj )]
.
+k(j − 1)
δm+1−j (bj )

(v(j) − bj ) = (1 − k)j

(13)

The LHS of Eq. (13) is the amount that bid j is shaded below valuation
v(j). Lemmas 3 and 4 show that only the first term on the RHS of Eq. (13)
vanishes as N → ∞ ∀j. Hence, as N → ∞, the RHS will not vanish and
bids will not equal values if k ∈ (0, 1].
Remark 2. Not only does price taking fail to emerge, but since the non-zero
convergent term is multiplied by a factor of (j − 1), bids are diﬀerentially
shaded in the limit, indicating the possibility of ex post ineﬃciency. Swinkels
(2001) has shown that the uniform price auction achieves an ex ante expectation of eﬃciency in the limit, leading to a seeming contradiction with our
result. However, Swinkels’ result allows for diﬀerential shading over certain
regions of valuations, but hinges on the fact that it disappears over the “relevant” range of demand. The idea is that the probability that an ineﬃcient
bid wins approaches zero in the limit. We have shown that this ex ante
expectation of an eﬃcient allocation is not driven by price taking behavior.
6. Conclusions
The literature on single object auctions has provided a variety of results
concerning revenue generation, allocative eﬃciency, and price formulation.
The slow development of a cohesive theory of multi-unit auctions led economists to use these results to predict outcomes of their multi-unit counterparts
(see Chari and Weber 1992). Unfortunately, recent theoretical advances have
10

shown that the added complexities of a multi-unit environment lead to starkly
diﬀerent conclusions than those suggested by single object models. Despite
these recent breakthroughs, the understanding of multi-unit auctions is far
from complete. This paper enhances the understanding of multi-unit auctions by isolating the asymptotic properties of equilibria in IPV discriminatory and uniform price auctions. Our primary findings are that as the
number of bidders grows large: (1) price taking behavior emerges in discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions where the price paid equals the
lowest winning bid and (2) price taking does not occur in any uniform price
auction where the price is tied to the highest losing bid.
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